SITUATION NOTE — RICE VALUE CHAIN

The unsold local rice glut in the Senegal River Valley (2025-2026) and the role of public procurement

State of play as of early July 2026 — unsold stocks, causes and the government's emergency plan

Author: **Baitir Ndoye, Ph.D.**
REFT Institute, Inc. · Centennial, CO, USA
REFT Africa · Dakar, Senegal
July, 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY · *Résumé analytique*

The rice value chain of the Senegal River Valley is going through a severe marketing crisis at the very moment it has broken production records: in June 2026, roughly **335,000 tonnes** of rice and paddy remained unsold. The paradox is stark — the Valley produces, but the market does not absorb.

Three causes converge: competition from imported rice (nearly 1.39 Mt in 2025), the failure of the marketing arrangements, and a financial squeeze on producers and millers. In response, in early July 2026 the government adopted an **emergency plan** (temporary suspension of imports, a subsidy of 50 FCFA/kg, public purchase of about 9,000 t, and a State–traders memorandum).

These measures treat the symptom but do not create the stable demand that would secure the value chain. The decisive link remains **institutional public procurement** — contracted over several years, backed by an enforceable quality standard and steered by a value-chain observatory. **Rice sovereignty will be won through a governance model in which public demand becomes a permanent instrument of regulation rather than a crisis bandage.**

1. The paradox: record production, massive unsold stocks

The rice value chain of the Senegal River Valley is going through a severe marketing crisis at the very moment it has broken production records. In June 2026, roughly 335,000 tonnes of rice and paddy remained unsold, including more than 35,000 tonnes of milled white rice *(L'Observateur, 2026; Ndar Info, 2026)*. According to the Rice Interprofessional Committee (CIRIZ), the latest campaigns produced nearly 729,000 tonnes of paddy, i.e. about 448,000 tonnes of white rice *(CIRIZ / APS, 2026)*. On top of these volumes, at the time of the alert, some 290,000 tonnes were arriving from around 49,000 hectares still being harvested — enough to worsen the glut *(L'Observateur, 2026)*. The paradox is brutal: the Valley produces, but the market does not absorb.

2. The causes: import competition and failing support mechanisms

Three factors converge. First, **competition from imported rice**, sold more cheaply: Senegal imported nearly 1.39 million tonnes of rice in 2025, worth about 522 billion FCFA *(Seck / SenePlus, 2026)*. Second, the **failure of the marketing arrangements**: an agreement signed on 12 November 2025 with importers made it possible to move only about 6,050 tonnes before the importers suspended their purchases, for lack of competitiveness against imports *(APS, 2026)*. Third, a **financial squeeze**: partial shutdown of milling, workers placed on temporary layoff, and the withdrawal of banks, which jeopardises the financing of the coming rainy-season campaign *(APS, 2026)*. Producers fear they will not be able to repay their loans, which directly threatens the food sovereignty objective.

3. The public response: the emergency plan of July 2026

Following a protest march by value-chain stakeholders at Ross-Béthio and an inter-ministerial council chaired by Prime Minister Ahmadou Al Aminou Lo, in early July 2026 the government adopted an emergency plan combining import regulation, price support and the activation of public procurement *(APS, 2026; Tambacounda.info, 2026)*. The main measures are as follows:

Measures of the emergency plan (July 2026)

- Suspension, for one month, of the issuance of import declarations for food products, in order to drain the market of imported stocks *(APS, 2026)*.
- New import quotas made conditional on the prior purchase of set quantities of local rice *(APS, 2026)*.
- A subsidy of 50 FCFA/kg to millers and a selling price of 280 FCFA/kg to partner traders *(Tambacounda.info, 2026)*.
- Public purchase of about 9,000 tonnes of white rice through the ARM and the Directorate of Domestic Trade, for 3.15 billion FCFA *(Tambacounda.info, 2026)*.
- A State–traders memorandum of understanding (8 July 2026) setting the timetable, the distribution areas and the marketing logistics *(APS / allAfrica, 2026)*.
- Rigorous monitoring of institutional purchases (ministries and public entities) under a circular letter from the Prime Minister, with a weekly monitoring committee *(APS, 2026)*.
- A campaign to promote the consumption of local rice *(APS, 2026)*.

These measures extend decisions already taken earlier: the setting of a local rice price (350 FCFA/kg) coupled with a restriction on imports in November 2025, then a purchasing rule imposed on the administration in February 2026 to prioritise national production *(Senego, 2026)*.

4. Reading: public procurement as a structural, not a cyclical, lever

The crisis confirms the argument developed in earlier work: the glut is not a production problem, but a problem of outlets **and of regulation**. One-off buy-backs and emergency subsidies treat the symptom; they do not create the stable demand that would secure the value chain. The decisive link remains **institutional public procurement** — the army, hospitals, prisons, universities, school canteens — whose potential has been estimated elsewhere as a floor outlet of several tens of thousands of tonnes per year. Yet this is precisely where commitments have lagged most: millers denounce the non-application of the public purchases that were nonetheless announced *(APS, 2026)*. Three conditions would make this lever truly structuring: (a) contracting multi-year volumes between millers' associations and large public consumers, under the aegis of the Ministries of Agriculture and Trade; (b) backing these contracts with an enforceable quality standard, which strips “quality” of its status as a pretext for refusal; and (c) establishing a value-chain observatory based on shared data, so that imports, storage and support are calibrated on objective facts *(Seck / SenePlus, 2026)*. In other words, rice sovereignty will not be won in the paddy fields alone, but through a governance of the value chain in which public demand becomes a permanent instrument of regulation rather than a crisis bandage.

References

APS (2026). Un plan d'urgence élaboré pour faciliter la commercialisation du riz local; Ross-Béthio: l'État invité à prendre des mesures urgentes; Riz local: des producteurs expriment leurs inquiétudes face aux stocks d'invendus. *aps.sn*

CIRIZ / APS (2026). Statements of the Rice Interprofessional Committee — production of ~729,000 t of paddy (~448,000 t of white rice) and unsold stocks. Ross-Béthio, July 2026.

L'Observateur (2026). Vallée du fleuve: la filière rizicole face aux invendus (335,000 t of rice and paddy; 35,000 t of white rice; ~290,000 t to come). Groupe Futurs Médias. *seneweb.com*

Ndar Info (2026). Riz en souffrance dans la vallée: about 335,000 t unsold in June 2026; inter-ministerial council chaired by the Prime Minister. *ndarinfo.com*

Seck, P. A. / SenePlus (2026). Le paradoxe du riz: quelques suggestions pour mieux valoriser le riz local (2025 imports: ~1.39 Mt / ~522 billion FCFA; contracting and value-chain observatories). *seneplus.com*

Tambacounda.info (2026). Crise du riz local: l'État déploie un plan d'urgence pour écouler les stocks (subsidy of 50 FCFA/kg; price of 280 FCFA/kg; purchase of ~9,000 t for 3.15 billion FCFA). *tambacounda.info*

Senego (2026). Riz en souffrance: mesures d'urgence du Premier ministre; recall of the decisions of November 2025 (price of 350 FCFA/kg, import restriction) and of February 2026 (public purchasing rule). *senego.com*

Note: synthesis of press and institutional sources as of early July 2026; stock figures and measures are evolving rapidly and should be updated at the time of use.